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1. Introduction
David Hume begins A Treatise of Human Nature by dividing perceptions of the mind into
impressions and ideas and builds the rest of his project in A Treatise on this distinction. The
distinction is vague: he explains that the difference between impressions and ideas “consists in
the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind and make their way into
our thought or consciousness” (T 1.1.1.1).1 Essentially, the difference between impressions and
ideas consists in the “force” and “vivacity” with which they appear to the mind: impressions
strike the consciousness with more force or vivacity than ideas do. Hume does not refine this
distinction further, and equates it with the difference between thinking and feeling (T 1.1.1.1).
As it stands, Hume’s distinction causes problems for his theory because it does not
provide a way to distinguish between species of impressions—weak impressions tend to
resemble ideas, and strong ideas tend to resemble impressions. Since Hume asserts that the
distinction amounts to differing degrees of force and vivacity, it can be difficult to distinguish
species of perception from one another. For example: a strong idea may possess the same amount
of force and vivacity as an impression, and if the only difference between impressions and ideas
is force, then it seems that there is no way to tell the strong idea from the impression. This puts
the soundness of Hume’s entire project at risk.
Due to the loose manner in which it is defined, Hume’s distinction between impressions
and ideas can be interpreted in multiple ways. The traditional, or standard, interpretation charges
that the “force and vivacity” formulation of the distinction is either “not very plausible” or
“simple to the point of idiocy” (Everson, 402). The traditional interpretation takes issue with the
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References to “T” are of (Hume 2000) with the book, part, section, and paragraph numbers.
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lack of a defined distinction between impressions and ideas, and charges that Hume provides no
reliable way to distinguish the two.
As an alternative to the standard account, Stephen Everson formulates the functional
account, which interprets force and vivacity as causal notions and defines the force and vivacity
of perceptions as their ability to affect the mind. Everson states that interpreting impressions and
ideas causally gives a more satisfying account than the traditional reading can; however, this
functional account still lacks the something that clearly defines the difference between
impressions and ideas. Everson calls for some quality, inherent in the perception, that is “over
and above” force and vivacity (408).
The issue with the distinction between impressions and ideas resolves into the fact that
there must be some property other than force and vivacity that allows us to differentiate
perceptions. Hume’s vague distinction causes two main problems for his theory: (1) It does not
have provisions for differentiation in cases such as weak impressions and strong ideas; (2) it
cannot fully explicate beliefs—lively ideas related to present impressions. There must be
something that allows us to distinguish one type of impression from another type of impression,
and impressions from beliefs. Hume’s loosely-defined distinction does not provide clarity
between types of impressions and is not rigorous enough to support his theory effectively.
To explicate the distinction between impressions and ideas, I will supplement Everson’s
functional account with the property that makes perceptions differentiable. I will argue that this
property is representative ability, and that the substantive difference between impressions and
ideas is the capability to represent something. Impressions are incapable of having representative
or intentional content; however, ideas inherently possess intentional content and have the ability
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to represent by virtue of how they are formed. Explicating this representative distinction will
provide clear guidelines for distinguishing impressions from ideas and will place the burden of
distinction on properties that inhere in the perception, rather than on force and vivacity. I will
also use the representative distinction to address the problems with Hume’s notion of belief.
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2. Hume’s Impressions and Ideas, and the Standard Reading
2.1 Hume’s Theory of Ideas
In this section I will give a brief introduction to Hume’s theory of ideas, and explain how
it relates to the phenomenological concepts I will introduce later. Hume declares that “all the
perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds,” which he labels
impressions and ideas (T 1.1.1.1). Impressions are “all our sensations, passions and emotions, as
they make their first appearance in the soul,” and ideas are the “faint images” of impressions
present in thinking and reasoning (T 1.1.1.1). He repeatedly asserts that impressions are always
antecedent to ideas, that ideas are copies of impressions, and that these ideas represent the
impressions from which they are derived (T 1.1.1.12). Furthermore, Hume claims that the
difference between impressions and ideas lies in the “degrees of force and liveliness” with which
they appear to the mind (T 1.1.1.1). This particular point makes up Hume’s distinction, and is the
basis of the complaints about his theory. I will discuss this further in the next section.
Hume posits that impressions and ideas can either be simple or complex. Simple
perceptions are those that “admit of no distinction or separation,” and complex perceptions can
be broken down into parts (T 1.1.1.2). Hume further divides impressions into original and
secondary, also known as impressions of sensation and reflection, respectively. 2 He does not give
a detailed account of impressions of sensation, as he asserts that “the examination of our
sensations belongs more to anatomists” (T 1.1.2.1). He instead gives a thorough account of
secondary impressions.

2

Hume initially distinguishes impressions into impressions of sensation and reflection in 1.1.2, but later in 2.1.1 he
resolves this distinction into original and secondary.
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Hume defines original and secondary impressions in the following passage.
Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without any
antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from
the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs.
Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these
original ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea. Of the first
kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of
the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them (T 2.1.1.1).

What Hume means here is that original impressions are not reliant upon preceding impressions
or ideas; they are foundational in this sense. Secondary impressions, by contrast, arise from ideas
or other impressions, and are dependent upon them. It seems appropriate for Hume to refer to
some secondary impressions as “reflective” because there is always some post-reflective or
extra-experiential component involved in their creation. Original impressions are pre-reflective
and experientially radical.
Hume begins his treatment of the passions by dividing them into direct and indirect. He
defines the direct passions as those arising “immediately from good or evil, from pain or
pleasure.” Hume asserts that the indirect passions derive from the same principles as the direct,
but with “the conjunction of other qualities” (T 2.1.2.4). He gives a thorough account of the
indirect passions, but is very brief with the direct passions, citing that “none of the direct
affections seem to merit our particular attention, except hope and fear” (T 2.3.9.9).
Hume considers desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security to be direct
passions. The indirect passions include pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity,
malice, and generosity. Note that Hume explicitly states that the passions do not represent; he
asserts that “a passion is an original existence…and contains not any representative quality” (T
2.3.3.5). Here I will focus on the more thorough account of the indirect passions to prepare for
later exposition of how they acquire intentional content.
5

Hume explains his account of the indirect passions by using the familiar notions of pride
and humility. He asserts that pride and humility have the same object: the self. He explains that
the passions must have both an object and a cause, but he stresses that the object and the cause of
these passions cannot be the same. He states that one idea will produce a passion, and that the
passion “turns our view to another idea” (T 2.1.2.4). The first idea is the cause of the passion,
and the second is the object of the passion. Regarding the cause of a passion, Hume makes a
distinction between the quality, which stimulates the passion, and the subject in which the quality
occurs. Furthermore, he posits that the subject must be in some sort of relation to us, otherwise
the quality would not stimulate the passion.
To illustrate this in the case of pride, Hume gives us an example of a beautiful house. If I am
proud of my beautiful house, the cause of my pride is the beautiful house. The quality of the
cause in this case is beauty, and the subject is my house—a house that is related to me via
possession. I am the object in this example. There is nothing in the passion itself that represents.
The idea of “my beautiful house” may cause the passion of pride, but the intentional content
belongs to the idea itself. My pride is directed at me, making it an intentional state, but the pride
itself does not possess intentional content. The pride does not represent the beauty, the house, or
any combination of the two. The passions require relations of ideas, and it seems that this is how
they acquire intentional content.
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2.2 The Standard Reading
In “The Difference between Thinking and Feeling,” Stephen Everson admits that Hume’s
notion of the difference between impressions and ideas is perplexing. Everson suggests that,
because of the way Hume conceives of perceptions, it is odd that he is inclined to explain the
distinction in terms of force and vivacity instead of causally (401). Hume does not commit to an
explanation of how impressions arise, and Everson notes that this refusal to “look outside of the
mind when defining impressions” is purposeful (401). Everson suggests that Hume’s skepticism
regarding the external world places this constraint upon impressions and ideas. Everson posits
that it would be ridiculous to appeal to external objects in order to make distinctions between
impressions and ideas, because we do not have a solid reason to believe that they exist. This is
why “the distinction between ideas and impressions is drawn in terms of their force and
liveliness or vivacity, since these properties of ‘perceptions’ are available to introspection” (402).
Everson is worried that, even though we can explain the reason for the style of Hume’s
distinction, we have a more difficult time explaining the distinction itself. He states that this
account does not give us any idea of what force and vivacity actually are as properties of
perceptions. He posits that commentators either avoid the question of what Hume actually means
by force and vivacity, or they brand his theory as “not very plausible” or “simple to the point of
idiocy” (403). Everson states that Jonathan Bennett takes “force and liveliness to be equivalent to
intensity and violence” and declares that this explanation is overly simple (402). Everson defines
this as the standard reading of Hume’s distinction. Furthermore, Everson explains that Barry
Stroud seems to take Hume’s distinction almost literally, and in doing so, also suggests that force
and liveliness are to be understood in terms of intensity and violence, and this further obscures
the difference between weak impressions and strong ideas (403).
7

Everson posits that both of these interpretations of Hume’s distinction are the traditional
understanding, and this is what he wants to challenge. He sums up the use of force and vivacity
in the traditional interpretation as such: force and vivacity “refer to intrinsic properties of images,
and are non-relational” (404). What this means is that, in the traditional interpretation, force and
vivacity are considered intrinsic properties of perceptions. They are considered non-relational
because whatever force or vivacity a perception possesses can be ascertained by surveying the
perception itself. However, Everson warns that the term ‘image’ simply means ‘copy,’ and we
should take care to not attribute a strictly imagistic interpretation to Hume’s theory (405). In the
following sections, I will explicate both Bennett’s and Stroud’s account of Hume’s distinction.

Bennett’s Account
In Locke, Berkeley, and Hume: Central Themes, Jonathan Bennett suggests that Hume’s
distinction between impressions and ideas is overly simple, and bases this conclusion on Hume
allegedly equating impressions to “intense or violent sensory states” (Bennett, 225). Bennett
begins his argument by asserting that Hume’s account suggests that impressions are nothing
more than forceful perceptions and that they occur only “in experience of the objective realm”
(224). Bennett asserts that Hume’s “official position is that (a) the impression/idea line is just the
lively/faint line within perceptions… (b) impressions occur only in experience of the objective
realm, and that (c) ideas occur only in thinking and reasoning” (224). While Bennett does not
give a definition for his use of the term “objective realm,” he seems to imply that he means some
physically-observable world. He defines Hume’s impressions as “the sense-data of normal
perceptions” (222).
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Bennett takes issue with Hume’s initial characterization of the difference between
impressions and ideas as put forth in the opening paragraph of A Treatise. A large amount of
Bennett’s argument is supported by his interpretation of this passage:
Every one of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and
thinking. The common degrees of these are easily distinguish’d; tho’ it is not
impossible but in particular instances they may very nearly approach to each
other. Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of
soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions (T 1.1.1.1).

Bennett asserts that, even if this passage is misinterpreted, it is clear that Hume is equating
impressions with “perceptions of the objective realm” (225). Furthermore, Bennett claims that
when this is combined with Hume’s account of the distinction between impressions and ideas,
then Hume is equating “‘experience of the objective realm’ with ‘intense or violent sensory
states’” and that this, taken as an explanation of what it is to have perceptions of the objective
realm “would be simple to the point of idiocy” (225).3

Stroud’s Account
Stroud raises a similar objection. He argues that Hume does not make the difference
between impressions and ideas very clear and does not attempt to explicate his point further.
Stroud asserts that Hume is making a claim about what the difference between impressions and
ideas is, and that this claim needs to be defended and explained. According to Stroud the obvious
3

It is not clear whether Bennett took into account the remainder of this passage from A Treatise:

As on the other hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint
and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas. But notwithstanding
this near resemblance in a few instances, they are in general so very different,
that no one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads (T 1.1.1.1).
It seems that, if Bennett were to take into account the remainder of this passage, then his suggestion that Hume is
equating impressions with ‘violent sensory states’ may encounter some problems. For the purposes of this paper, I
will not attempt to defend Hume from Bennett’s claims—I am providing Bennett’s account as an example of the
traditional reading of the distinction between impressions and ideas.
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difference between thinking and feeling does not inform the difference between impressions and
ideas. He asserts that simply claiming that the distinction is the difference between thinking and
feeling does not amount to a coherent account. He concludes that:
Certainly everyone will acknowledge that there is a difference between feeling
or perceiving something and merely thinking about it in its absence, and not
many words are needed to convince people of that distinction. But Hume is
putting forward a view about what that difference is. He says it is merely a
difference in the degree of ‘force and liveliness’ with which certain perceptions
strike upon the mind. And that does need explanation and defence. The
obviousness of the fact that there is a distinction between perceiving and
thinking does not make Hume’s account of that difference obvious. In fact, it is
not even clear what his account comes to (Stroud, 28).

In Hume, Stroud illustrates his objection with the example of a detective. A detective may
survey the scene of a murder and make mental note of the various features of it; later on the
detective may recall with accuracy what he had seen at the scene of the murder. Stroud states
that, according to Hume, the detective would have an idea that exactly resembles his impressions
of the room (29). While recalling the scene the detective remembers that the victim is righthanded, and in his recollection, notices that a fire poker is leaning on the left-hand side of the
fireplace. Stroud claims that this sudden insight is a perception that is more vivid than the initial
impression the detective had at the scene of the crime. Stroud explains:
That part of his present idea that includes the fireplace and the poker now
strikes upon his mind or consciousness with much greater force and liveliness
than the corresponding part of the exactly similar scene had done earlier. Given
the theory of ideas, it would seem that the detective had a perception before the
mind when he was just thinking about the fireplace and the poker in their
absence that strike his mind or consciousness with a greater degree of force and
liveliness than did the perception he had before the mind when he originally
perceived them. And such things seem to happen often (29).

Stroud uses this example to argue that, if the only difference between impressions and ideas is
force or vivacity, then the detective was having an impression when he was simply thinking
about the room, and an idea when he was originally perceiving it (29). According to Stroud, this
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situation creates problems for Hume’s theory—it indicates that an idea may have come before its
corresponding impression. If Stroud’s assertion is correct, then this is damning for Hume’s
theory of ideas.
Stroud concludes that Hume either needs to further define force and liveliness of
perceptions, or he must find some other way to differentiate ideas from impressions. Stroud
suggests that one less problematic way to make the distinction would be to say that “impressions
are those perceptions that are before the mind when and only when we are actually perceiving or
being stimulated by some external physical object” (29).
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3. Everson’s Reply to the ‘Traditional Interpretation’
3.1

The Functional Account
Everson argues that any account of Hume’s theory of ideas must conform to two

restrictions. First, Hume does not set up force and vivacity as technical terms, so they must be
understood as literally as possible. Second, the account needs to recognize Hume’s “solipsistic
account of the mind” and make a perception’s force and vivacity available to introspection (403).
Everson states that he considers the traditional interpretation of Hume’s terms force and vivacity
as referring to “intrinsic properties of images” and posits that they are non-relational. What he
means here is that force and vivacity inhere in the perception, and that the degree of force and
vivacity can be discerned by surveying the perception itself (404). He explains that the nature of
force and vivacity in this conception make giving an exact analysis of the terms very difficult for
Hume.
To explain the traditional interpretation, Everson gives an analogy between perceptions
and a slide projection: when the perception is an impression, then the projector has a bright bulb
and clear lens; when the perception is an idea, the bulb is dimmer and the lens is less clear.
Everson admits that the analogy does not work if we appeal to a causal explanation of how the
projected images differ; but an observer who is completely ignorant of image projection
technology would distinguish between the two with the “intrinsic properties” of the projections
(404). Everson posits that this theory conforms to the second restriction—respecting Hume’s
solipsistic account of the mind—but if we are going to consider force and vivacity as ‘intrinsic
properties’ then we will need to understand Hume’s entire theory in terms of images.
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Everson argues that if we look harder at the traditional model for the distinction, we can
raise serious concerns caused by the restrictions placed upon it. The first problem with the
traditional model is that force and vivacity, understood fairly literally per the first restriction, are
causal notions; Everson cites that Hume uses power and force interchangeably throughout his
account of causation. Furthermore, he argues that Hume uses force, vivacity and liveliness to
refer to the same properties (406).
Everson asserts that Hume is treating force and vivacity causally; he paraphrases Hume
as stating that “one ‘perception’ has greater force or vivacity than another if it is such as to
produce a stronger effect on the mind” (406). He demonstrates that a benefit of reading force and
vivacity as causal concepts is that Hume’s distinction between the ideas of the memory and
imagination becomes clearer. He cites Hume’s notion of a ‘perfect idea’ as an idea that has lost
all vivacity: according to the traditional interpretation of the distinction, the ‘perfect idea’ would
not make any sense, as force and vivacity are considered intrinsic properties of perceptions
(407). Everson points out that, if we understand force and vivacity causally, then the notion of
‘perfect idea’ is unproblematic—force is “no longer an intrinsic or an essential property of an
idea;” therefore, an idea without force will simply fail to affect the mind in a particular manner
(407).
Additionally, Everson suggests that Hume is not trying to define the difference between
thinking and feeling as the difference between impressions and ideas. It is instead the other way
around: Hume uses the difference between thinking and feeling to describe the difference
between impressions and ideas. Everson asserts that Hume does not explicate the difference
between thinking and feeling further because “it does not stand in need of explanation,” as
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everyone can easily perceive the difference (407). Everson suggests that the difference between
thinking and feeling lies in being actuated differently. For example, a man who is feeling angry
will be caused to behave differently than a man who is simply thinking about being angry (408).
Everson posits that “given a suitable set of beliefs and desires, one’s feelings will motivate one
to action whereas one’s mere thoughts will not” (408).
3.2 Where the Functional Account Leaves Off
The functional account does not cover it all though; it does not account for very weak
impressions and very strong ideas. Since force and vivacity cannot be inherent qualities in
perceptions, we still need to provide qualities or features inherent in the perceptions themselves
that allow them to be differentiable. Everson correctly points out that Hume’s account does not
have a provision for how to differentiate species of impressions and species of ideas from other
impressions and ideas. He seems particularly concerned about Hume’s notion of belief, as it is a
particularly strong species of idea that resembles an impression with no protocol for
differentiation.
Everson explains that the functional account still does not clearly distinguish between
types of impressions and ideas. Indeed, since beliefs are ideas and they are clearly motivating,
the actual distinction between impressions and ideas cannot rest on the causal explanation
offered by the functional account. He urges that this difference relies either on “some
distinguishing feature over and above their simple possession of force and vivacity” or on a more
detailed account of how each perception affects the mind (408).
Everson raises another issue with the causal interpretation and Hume’s account of belief,
suggesting that it does not leave room for perceptual beliefs. This could render Hume’s claims
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about belief incoherent. Everson describes a continuing impression of a piece of paper—as he
stares at the paper and has a continuing impression of it, he is unable to form an idea of it, and is
therefore unable to have a belief about it. He states that, if only force and vivacity are used to
differentiate impressions and ideas, then an impression and its corresponding idea cannot
coexist—the impression must lapse to allow room for its idea to emerge (409). Everson suggests
that this sort of explanation would make perceptual beliefs impossible.
Everson proposes that this explanation might not be problematic for Hume because his
account of belief “derives its explanatory force” from his “obviously functional account” of
impressions (409). Furthermore, Everson points out that Hume’s characterization of beliefs
makes them almost analogous with impressions; Hume intends to explicate the difference
between beliefs and other ideas with the same terms that he uses to differentiate impressions and
ideas. Everson claims that the problem with this kind of distinction is that, by characterizing
beliefs and impressions in the way that he does, Hume makes it nearly impossible to differentiate
between the two. Everson asserts that, even though Hume does not give an official answer
regarding “distinguishing impressions from forceful ideas,” he leaves enough room to argue that
there might be a way to distinguish between them. In the next section, I will attempt to define the
basic distinction between impressions and ideas.
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4. Phenomenology and the Representative Distinction
I will now present my argument for the substantive difference between impressions and
ideas. I submit that the difference between impressions and ideas is the ability to represent,
recognized through categorial intuition. First, I will provide a brief introduction to the
phenomenological concepts I will employ in my argument. Second, I will explain how an idea
comes to represent. Third, I will supplement Everson’s functional account with what I call the
representative distinction. Finally, I will address Stroud’s detective and the problem with beliefs.
4.1 Phenomenological Concepts
The first phenomenological concept is the foundational concept—intentionality and
intending.4 Intentionality is the notion that “every act of consciousness is directed towards an
object of some kind” (9). When we have an idea, it is an idea about or of something. The idea
has intentional content; intentional content represents something. When we intend, we have a
conscious relationship with an object (8). In the context of phenomenology, intention means
mental or cognitive, not practical intentions, such as “I intend to go to the store later today.”
Intentions can be either empty or filled. An empty intention is an intending that takes
something that is not present to the intender as its object. A filled intention takes something that
is present to the intender as its object. We often have empty intentions about something that
gradually become filled intentions; when the empty intentions become filled intentions, we have
intuition of the intended object. Take a play, for example: I see an advertisement for a play, and
decide to purchase tickets. I think about the play in the weeks leading up to the performance, and
I talk about it with my friends. These are empty intentions, because the object of my intention is
4

These concepts are as Robert Sokolowski explains in his book, Introduction to Phenomenology.
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not present to me. When I watch the play my intentions become filled intentions. The play is
present to me; while I watch it, I have intuition of the play. Robert Sokolowski explains that
intuition is “simply having the object actually present to us, in contrast with having it intended in
its absence” (35).
The second phenomenological concept is that of categorial intuition. According to
Sokolowski, the word categorial “refers to the kind of intending that articulates an object, the
kind that introduces syntax into what we experience” (88). A categorial object5 is an object in a
certain sort of context—‘a chair’ is a simple object, but ‘my blue chair’ is a categorial object. In
order for a simple object to become a categorial object, we go through three phases. The first
phase is the initial perception of the object. There is no particular thought process associated with
impressions of the object at this point. In the second phase a feature of the object comes to our
attention. The feature is “highlighted” and we take notice of it. In the third phase the object
becomes recognized as a whole, and the highlighted portion is recognized as a part of the whole.
The whole stands apart from the background, and the part stands out from the whole.
In order for the perceived object to become a categorial object, “a relation between whole
and part” must be “articulated and registered;” the whole and the part must be recognized as
being distinct and a relation between the two must be disclosed (90). Sokolowski explains that
this articulation is categorial intuition—the moment at which the categorial object becomes
present to us.

The word object here is not intended to be limited to physical objects. It can refer to anything we can have an
impression of.
5
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Here is an example of categorial intuition: I see an oak tree. I perceive the tree’s textures,
colors, and extension. As I am looking at the tree, I notice a hollow in its trunk; the hollow
becomes a highlighted feature. I recognize the tree as a whole, and recognize that the hollow is a
distinct part of the tree. I understand that this oak tree has a hollow in it—this is categorial
intuition, and at the same moment, the tree has become present to me as a categorial object. I can
now declare that “this oak tree has a hollow in it.” The oak tree has emerged from the
background of unarticulated perceptions, and the hollow stands out from the whole of the oak
tree.
Categorial intuition disrupts the flow of impressions and affords us a packaged state of affairs
that can be “detached from the immediacy of perception,” communicated, and related to other
states of affairs (92). Sokolowski explains that once we have achieved categorial intuition, “we
have moved from sensibility to intellection, from mere experiencing to an initial understanding”
(90).
4.2 Impressions, Ideas, Intention and Representation
I submit that categorial intuition of an object is necessary in order for it to represent anything,
because it needs to be differentiable from all other objects. We must move from impressions to
ideas and reflect in order for something to be represented—this is the difference between
impressions and ideas. Impressions cannot represent for us, because they do not directly involve
thought, nor can they be reflected upon. If someone is reflecting on something, they are
reflecting on an idea, because it is not possible to reflect on impressions themselves. I submit that
the substantive difference between impressions and ideas is representational ability. Ideas have
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the ability to represent, and impressions do not. In this section, I will explain why impressions do
not have representative ability.
In order for something to be represented, a relation is required—a representation is a
representation of something; this indicates a relation between the two. The representation needs
to resemble or otherwise be connected to the thing being represented. The represented object
must also be distinguished from the background of other objects. Here I will argue that some
process of thought or consideration is requisite for a “relation.” Hume explains relations as such,
with the former relation being natural, and the latter being philosophical:
The word relation is commonly us’d in two senses considerably different from
each other. Either for that quality, by which two ideas are connected together in
the imagination, and the one naturally introduces the other... or for that
particular circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in
the fancy, we may think proper to compare them (T 1.1.5.1).

From the language Hume uses here, it is evident that there is some sort of thinking going on in
relating one idea to another. With natural relations, it is something that the imagination does
automatically; with the philosophical relations, it is something that the mind can willingly do.
This characterization of philosophical relations indicates a process of thinking or consideration;
in order for me to compare one thing to another, I must consider things about them.
The role of consideration in the natural relations is less obvious, because one idea
“involuntarily” introduces another (Owen, 80). It seems as if the involuntary nature of the
transition between ideas would preclude consideration or thinking. In fact, Hume uses the term
imagination in a somewhat inexact manner throughout the Treatise, but it seems as if he intends
it to be considered as some sort of thinking. He states that “the imagination has the command
over all its ideas, and can, join, and mix, and vary them in all the ways possible” (T 1.3.7.7). The
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imagination deals with ideas, recall that ideas are “the faint images of [impressions] in thinking
and reasoning” (T 1.1.1.1). It seems as if consideration or thought is necessary when dealing
with relations. In order for one thing to represent another, these things must stand in a relation
with one another, and recognizing this relation requires some form of consideration or
intellection whether implicit or explicit.
Recall that impressions resolve into original and secondary. Original impressions are prereflective and experientially radical; secondary impressions are post-reflective and arise from
other impressions or ideas. It follows from all this, that if original impressions are experientially
radical and pre-reflective, then they cannot be put into a relation with something they are
purported to represent. Since secondary impressions necessarily rely on preceding perceptions
(whether through an idea or another impression) it is clear that the impressions cannot represent
on their own. Ideas and secondary impressions are dependent upon pre-reflective experience.
Pre-reflective experience cannot have representative content, because this would require some
kind of consideration of the content. The representing comes into play through relations, and this
occurs after reflection and categorial intuition.
I am not suggesting that impressions do not have content, they must have experiential
content, but the point is that the content of an impression cannot represent. 6 The experiential
content is represented by an idea related to the impression. So all impressions, including
passions, only acquire representative content by having an idea associated with them. I submit
that recognizing a representation requires categorial intuition. Recall that categorial intuition
This is especially true when we consider the restrictions of Hume’s solipsistic account of mind. If impressions are
purely mental or internal phenomena, then they certainly cannot represent anything—they are simply too primary to be a
representation of something. Take a painting, for example: a reproduction of a painting is a representation, but the
painting itself is a sort of primary existence—it simply is itself, not a representation of itself.
6
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facilitates differentiating the parts from the whole and the whole from the background;
furthermore, it allows us to put our perceptions into a context in which we can understand that
the part is of the whole but separate. You cannot have an idea of red chair without having
categorial intuition of the chair to begin with.
To illustrate my argument, consider the following example. While walking down the
street, I am struck and injured by a red car. I have original impressions of the pain, of the red, of
the extension and body of the car, and the sounds that are made during the event. These are
simple impressions that are copied as simple ideas. According to Hume’s theory, these simple
ideas get joined together and become complex ideas. The ideas represent the impressions they
are derived from. So my idea of red car is a complex idea that links and represents my
impressions of the red and the car. At some point, I have categorial intuition and can recognize
the car as a red car or the red car that struck me. I can tell the police officers that “the car that
struck me was red.” I move from experiencing the red car as a series or group of impressions to
having an articulated idea of a red car that stands out from the background of unarticulated
perceptions.
After I heal from my injuries, I am walking down a street and I perceive a red car. Again,
I have impressions of red and car, these are again original impressions.7 These impressions
become the complex idea of red car, and I have an idea of pain associated with the idea of red
car. Recall that direct passions are considered secondary impressions and cannot arise without
the assistance of original impressions or ideas associated with them. My idea of red car is

I would not have an impression of car, as such. I would have various impressions of the shape, the color, and the
motion of the car. I have consolidated these impressions for the purposes of brevity.
7
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associated with the idea of my impression of the pain I experienced when struck by a red car, and
I therefore experience fear. In this example, my impression of red and car do not represent
anything, the simple ideas of red and car represent the concept of ‘something that has the quality
of the color red’ and ‘something that is a car.’ These ideas are linked by the one or more
principles of association and become the idea of red car.
My experience of fear does not represent anything, but the passion has the complex idea that
represents “that time I was struck and injured by a red car” annexed to it. This is how this
instance of my fear acquires intentional content. My fear is directed at or about the red car. The
fear itself does not represent the red car, or the time I was struck by a red car—it is only
associated with the ideas of these things.
Furthermore, I experienced categorial intuition of red car in this instance as well. If the idea
of red car had not emerged from the background, I would not have recognized it as such—I
might have only seen a car, or I might not have noticed it at all. In that case, my impressions of
red and car would not have become connected to “that time I was struck and injured by a red
car.” I would not have recognized the car as red car, and I would not have experienced fear.
It may be helpful here to recall the earlier example of my beautiful house. If I am proud of
my beautiful house, my pride is caused by the beautiful house. The quality that inspires the cause
is beauty, the subject is my house. There is nothing in the passion itself that represents—the
intentional content is in the idea itself. My pride is directed at something (myself, as the object of
the pride), which makes it an intentional state, but the pride itself does not possess any
intentional content. The pride does not represent the beauty or the house.
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These examples illustrate how impressions lack their own representative content, and only
become joined to content by being attached to an associated idea. They also illustrate how
representation hinges upon categorial intuition. The onus of representation belongs to ideas, not
to impressions. In order for something to represent, it has to stand out from the things it does not
represent. A red chair cannot represent a red chair unless it has been distinguished from other
kinds of chairs and the general background of unarticulated objects. In order for this to happen
we have to achieve categorial intuition, which brings the object into the foreground and
differentiates it from the unarticulated background. Categorial intuition relies upon relating parts
and wholes and involves reflection.
Impressions cannot be reflected upon, and can only be distinguished after the fact—they are
only reflected upon as ideas. Even if impressions could possess representative content, there
would be no way for us to comprehend it—any sort of differentiation that occurs in categorial
intuition requires the work of the intellect. I submit that the intentionality and representative
ability of ideas provides the “over and above” that Everson deems necessary for a clear
distinction between impressions and ideas.
4.3 Supplementing Everson’s Functional Account
Now I will address how my account of the representative distinction supplements Everson’s
functional account. Recall that Everson highlighted two restrictions on any account of the
distinction between impressions and ideas. First, force and vivacity are not defined as technical
terms, and must therefore be understood as literally as possible; second, the account must
conform to Hume’s solipsistic account of the mind. The representative distinction conforms to
these two restrictions.
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First, the representative distinction takes force and vivacity literally. Since the representative
distinction clearly informs the difference between impressions and ideas, force and vivacity are
freed to be purely causal terms as in Everson’s functional account. Furthermore, the distinction is
not founded on force and vivacity, so they therefore become additive properties to perceptions.
The representative distinction allows both impressions and ideas to take on varying degrees of
force and vivacity without confounding species of impressions. Take a strong idea for an
example: if the only difference between impressions and ideas is force and vivacity, then a strong
idea may resemble an impression, with no way to tell the two apart. If we apply the
representative distinction in this case, the strong idea is clearly an idea because it has
representative content—it is an idea about something. The idea happens to strike the mind with
much force and vivacity, and may feel similar to an impression, but now the idea is defined
independently of force and vivacity. Force and vivacity become additive qualities that seem to
inhere in the “delivery” of the perception to the mind—they simply affect how a perception
strikes the mind.
Second, the representative distinction conforms to Hume’s solipsistic account of the mind.
Since impressions are not representative, it is unnecessary to appeal to causes outside of the mind
to explain whether impressions represent what caused them. The representative distinction is not
affected whether impressions are caused by objects in the external world, or are completely
mental phenomena. Since the distinction between impressions and ideas is representative ability,
and ideas are copies of impressions, it makes no difference what caused an impression—the idea
will still represent the impression by virtue of being a copy of it.
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4.4 Answering Stroud’s Detective
The problems for Hume’s theory that are emphasized by Stroud’s detective example can be
addressed by the concepts I have introduced in this paper: first, using categorial intuition along
with Hume’s notion of the ideas of memory; second, with the representative distinction coupled
with force and vivacity.
First, when the detective recalls his idea of the scene of the crime, he has an idea of the
memory present. Hume posits that the ideas of the memory tend to retain some of the force and
vivacity provided by the impressions from which they were derived (T 1.1.3.1). While the
detective has the idea of the room present in his mind, he is struck by the position of the poker,
along with the idea that the victim was right-handed.
I submit that when the detective realized that the poker was on the wrong side of the
fireplace, he had categorial intuition. He recognized the scene as a whole, but then the poker
became highlighted. Once the poker was highlighted, he recognized it as a separate part of the
whole. The poker was placed into the scene’s context—it came into the foreground of the
detective’s idea of the scene; the detective could declare that the poker’s position was something
remarkable. This intuition spurred a secondary impression, something like an ‘aha!’ moment,
which provided force to his idea.
One possible problem with this position is that categorial intuition supposedly occurs
when moving from sensing to intellection. If the detective was thinking about the room, then he
must have already moved into intellection, so categorial intuition would have already occurred.
This problem can be answered by the fact that an idea, while being thought upon, is currently
present to the mind. It is a perception in the mind, and is therefore part of the detective’s
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immediate perceptual environment. If he recalled the room accurately, as Stroud asserts, then
there is no reason to suggest that he could not achieve categorial intuition within his idea of the
room. The idea of the room is a complex idea, and it is plausible that certain details might not
have been highlighted when he initially perceived the room.
Second, since we can distinguish between impressions and ideas based on representative
ability, we can suggest that the detective’s idea of the poker was just a remarkably strong idea. It
is uncontroversial to claim that he had an idea that represented the poker’s position in the room.
The representative distinction leaves plenty of room for us to claim that the strong idea of the
poker represents the poker and possessed a large degree of force and vivacity when it struck the
detective’s mind. Were the poker simply an impression, the detective would not have even
realized that it was on the left side of the fireplace—this would have required relating ideas,
which is impossible with mere impressions. The detective would have to relate the idea that the
victim was right-handed to the idea of the poker being on the left-hand side of the fireplace, and
this simply could not have occurred if the poker’s position were an impression as Stroud
suggests.
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4.5 The Problem with Beliefs
Hume asserts that belief alters the way we conceive of ideas and affords them more force and
vivacity, leading them to resemble impressions more closely than ideas; thus, he tends to explain
belief in terms of motivating force. Everson points out that Hume’s characterization of beliefs is
plagued by the issues that the force and vivacity distinction causes. Hume defines belief as “a
lively idea related to or associated with a present impression,” and states that “the idea of an
object is an essential part of the belief of it, but not the whole” (T 1.3.7.1-5). Beliefs come to
have motivating force similar to impressions by becoming strongly associated with impressions.
Hume insists that “when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to
such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and
vivacity” (T 1.3.8.2). Belief is still an idea—it is an idea of or about something that becomes
strongly associated with an impression.
Categorial intuition addresses Everson’s initial concerns about belief. Recall Everson’s
example of the continuous perceptions of the paper: he suggests that the unbroken impression
would not leave room for its corresponding idea to coexist, and he would not be able to form a
belief about the paper. Recall that categorial intuition disrupts continuous perception and affords
us categorial objects—packaged states of affairs—which we can differentiate from other
unarticulated objects, and relate to other categorial objects. Furthermore, ideas come to be
recognized as representative through categorial intuition—this process also applies to beliefs,
whether perceptual or otherwise. I would not avoid a pothole while driving my car unless I
believed it to be there, assenting to the idea of the pothole first requires a categorial intuition of
the pothole.
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Finally, if we accept that the difference between impressions and ideas is representative
ability, then beliefs are easily explained as strong perceptions that represent something and
motivate, and impressions are strong perceptions that do not represent something. Recall that the
representative distinction allows force and vivacity to become additive properties of perceptions,
and according to Everson’s functional account, greater degrees of force and vivacity tend to
motivate. It seems as if the representative distinction clearly defines beliefs as ideas and allows
us to assert that certain ideas can carry motivating force and vivacity—while remaining
identifiable as an idea.

5. Final Thoughts
The representative distinction can resolve most of the problems with Hume’s theory of ideas;
it clearly defines the difference between impressions and ideas, allows that some perceptions will
possess more force and vivacity that others, and conforms to the two restrictions Everson set
forth. Despite its strengths, the representative distinction may fall short of fully explicating the
notion of belief. Hume asserts that the belief is “something felt by the mind, which distinguishes
the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination” (T 1.3.7.7). While the
representative distinction can help to explain why a belief feels different than a mere idea—the
belief possesses a greater degree of force and vivacity— it cannot explain how assenting to an
idea works, or how it makes it a belief.
The representative distinction is based partly on the notion that ideas come to represent
through categorial intuition, and this process involves some act of the intellect whether implicit
or explicit. Since beliefs are ideas, they would also require some act of the intellect in order to be
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created. The way that Hume characterizes belief seems to complicate this matter for the
representative distinction. Hume states that:
I conclude, that the belief, which attends the present impression, and is
produc’d by a number of past impressions and conjunctions; that this belief, I
say, arises immediately, without any new operation of the reason or
imagination. Of this I can be certain, because I never am conscious of any such
operation, and find nothing in the subject, on which it can be founded (T
1.3.8.10).

If belief can arise “without any new operation of the reason or imagination,” then it seems as if
the representative distinction has a much harder time accounting for the formation of beliefs. The
claim that beliefs are simply strong motivating perceptions that represent becomes less sound if
we consider that representation requires an act of the intellect, which Hume seems to discount
here.
Perhaps we can mitigate this problem by taking Hume’s discussion regarding the “vulgar
division of the acts of the understanding” into account (T 1.3.7). He complains that acts of the
understanding are improperly divided into conception, judgment, and reasoning, and that these
acts collapse into conception (T 1.3.7). Hume explains:
What we may in general affirm concerning these three acts of the understanding
is, that taking them in a proper light, they all resolve themselves into the first,
and are nothing but particular ways of conceiving our objects….The act of the
mind exceeds not a simple conceptions; and the only remarkable difference,
which occurs on this occasion, is, when we join belief to the conceptions, and
are perswaded of the truth of what we conceive (T 1.3.7).

From this passage, it is clear that Hume considers conception as an act of the understanding. If
so, the representative distinction is less damaged by his comment that beliefs arise without “any
new operation of the reason or imagination,” since Hume asserts that belief does “nothing but
vary the manner, in which we conceive any object” (T 1.3.7.5). Whatever conception consists of,
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it is an act of the understanding and is therefore something that must deal with ideas, which can
be defined by the representative distinction. Even if we accept that belief simply alters the
conception of ideas and adds force to them, we are still left with the question of why and how we
assent to beliefs—and the representative distinction cannot account for this. The representative
distinction can go as far as explaining why a belief feels different to the mind than a mere idea,
but it cannot define or explain the mechanisms or motivations of assent.
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